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The paper looks at the overall structure of the European Union’s regional, agricultural and rural 
development policies in order to assess their coordination and synergies at the territorial level and 
their  degree  of  compatibility  with  the  objective  of  territorial  cohesion.  The  regression  analysis  - 
covering the 20-year period 1994-2013, and approximately 90% of total Community expenditure - 
reveals that the compatibility of the various areas of Community policy in terms of the objectives of 
territorial  cohesion  has  not  progressed  in  a  linear  fashion  over  time.  Shifting  resources  in  the 
Community  budget  from  one  policy  area  to  another  does  not,  by  itself,  appear  capable  of 
guaranteeing virtuous paths in terms of territorial cohesion. The increase in the territorial ‘vocation’ 
of overall Community spending will, therefore, crucially depend upon the definition of appropriate 
allocative mechanisms and interventions, based upon the characteristics of each region and its ‘local’ 
needs. 
 
JEL classifications:  O18, R11, R58 




An equitable territorial distribution of the benefits of the integration process is a founding principle of 
all European Union (EU) policies (article 175 of the European Union Treaty) and, as such, has been 
strongly emphasised in recent strategic programming documents including ‘Europe 2020’ (European 
Commission 2010a). In the framework of current reflections upon the future of EU policies, one idea 
has clearly emerged, namely that the objective of social and territorial cohesion within the Union 
cannot be wholly entrusted to cohesion policies (EESC 2007). On the one hand, the contribution made 
by all other policies - also those which are non-territorial by nature - towards the achievement of this 
objective (5th Cohesion Report, European Commission 2010) should be taken into account and, on 
the other, the mechanisms coordinating the various Community policies in this field reconsidered for  
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Notwithstanding the explicit request by EU policymakers for instruments able to perform a territorial-
level assessment of the interrelations between policies of different nature and their correlation with 
territorial cohesion a significant gap still exists in this area of academic literature.  Although some 
contributions (whether academic or more markedly policy oriented) have undertaken an analysis of 
the EU's regional and agricultural policies to determine their impact on the cohesion processes, the 
attention  of  these  scholars  and  analysts  has  alternated  between  one  or  the  other  policy  area  and 
overlooked both their interactions (synergic or conflicting) and joint impact at the territorial level. 
This separation can be explained by the different disciplinary approaches of the scholars concerned 
(mainly  agricultural  economists  for  agricultural  policies  and  regional  economists/economic 
geographers for regional policies, Kilkenny 2010) as well as by the division of responsibilities within 
Community bodies (DG AGRI and DG REGIO respectively) and the ministries of the single member 
states. As a result today’s literature offers few analytical insights for understanding the relationships 
between policies and the possibilities of influencing territorial cohesion by modifying the territorial 
allocation and composition of overall Community spending in favour of instruments with a more 
markedly territorial vocation. 
This work is an attempt to respond to the foregoing request and to contribute towards the present 
debate on the future of Community policies after 2013, by undertaking a comprehensive analysis of 
the EU's regional, agricultural and rural development policies, accounting, as they do,  for almost 90% 
of total Community spending. 
In the first place, it is necessary to adopt a territorial approach if we are to make a comprehensive 
analysis  of  policies  designed  and  implemented  for  different  objectives  and  addressing  highly 
variegated  range  of  beneficiaries.  Thus,  the  evaluation  of  their  compatibility  with  the  cohesion 
objectives requires us to consider their capacity, on the one hand, to interact within the same territory 
and, on the other, to target spending on the factors of structural disadvantage in each area (Barca 
2009). Consequently, in this study we shall adopt a territorial prospective in order to take due account 
of the profound systemic interactions operating at this level between the various beneficiaries of the 
different policies influencing growth and development dynamics and, hence, territorial cohesion itself. 
In the second place - unlike much extant literature - the analysis proceeds by considering the a priori 
structure of the policies rather than by attempting to evaluate their ex-post impact. The latter approach 
would be considerably hampered by the difficulties (also conceptual) of quantifying the effects of 
very  different  policies  that  can  manifest  themselves  after  different  periods  of  time  and  in  many 
different ways and forms. Furthermore, our approach to the analysis of Community policies also 
enables us to develop evaluation criteria for the structure of current expenditure (programming  period 
2007-2013) while an ex post impact analysis can only take place after a considerable lapse of time 
from the conclusion of the programming cycle. Most contemporary studies refer to expenditure prior 
to 2000 thereby preventing policymakers from drawing any "lessons" -even provisional - from the 
experience of the two programming  periods that followed on the heels of important reforms. In order 
to overcome these difficulties, our analysis concentrates upon the spatial structure of the funds as 
regards the various policy areas that they cover in order to evaluate potential synergies and conflicts 
before their attendant measures are implemented. Therefore, the analysis is concentrated upon the 
result of the resource allocation process at the territorial level in order to determine its spatial structure 
(territorial allocation), the synergies between the different policy areas (composition of expenditure 
and territorial coordination).  
In the third place the analysis is focused on the assessment of the coherence between the distribution 
of funding and the geography of regional structural disadvantage factors. As will be further discussed 
in the conceptual section of the paper, this approach is based on the idea that Community support – 
where aiming to increase territorial cohesion – should be targeted towards the regions where structural 
disadvantage  is  concentrated.  While  different  policies  will  tackle  different  ‘components’  of  this 
disadvantage a growing body of literature has suggested that the capacity of any policy to promote 
territorial  cohesion  is  premised  upon  its  elimination  by  means  of  a  balanced  policy-mix.  As  a 
consequence the ‘a priori’ coherence between the EU policies and the objective of territorial cohesion 
will be assessed in terms of their capability to channel resources towards structurally disadvantaged 
areas as a necessary (though certainly not sufficient) pre-condition for pro-cohesion effects. 
From this standpoint the paper looks first at the existing EU policy documents and regulations that 
have shaped the structure and the development over time of the three areas of Community policy in   6 
order to highlight the possible points of contact that EU policymakers strove and still strive for with 
special  reference  to  their  reciprocal  coordination  and  the  principle  of  territorial  cohesion.  The 
subsequent empirical analysis of the territorial structure of Community spending for each of the three 
policy areas over a period of almost two decades (1994-2013) will test if any correspondence obtains 
between actual spending and the "potential" synergies highlighted by the preceding policy-documents 
analysis. Furthermore, the extent of the time interval considered enables us to evaluate the potential 
impact of moving resources from one policy area to another (e.g. from essentially sectoral, "first 
pillar" CAP policies in favour of "territorial" measures for rural development policies) in terms of 
spatial structure, and the level of coordination while also revealing what association, if any, may exist 
between  structural  disadvantage  and  overall  Community  spending,  thereby  throwing  light  on  the 
coherence of such reallocation with the objective of territorial cohesion 
2. Sectoral and territorial policies and the structural disadvantage of European regions 
In the present debate on the future composition of the EU budget and its policies, there seems to be a 
consensus on the need to harmonise the different Community policies and ensure their compatibility 
with the objective of territorial cohesion. This consensus is by now part and parcel of the Union's 
overall  growth  and  development  strategy  ("Europe  2020
4  )  and  an  essential  component  of  its 
guidelines for reforming the single policies in line with this strategy (‘Fifth Cohesion Report’ and 
‘Barca  Report’
5  for  regional  policies;  ‘The  CAP  Towards  2020’
6  for  agricultural  and  rural 
development policies). The construction of an appropriate analytical and evaluative framework to 
sustain the resulting priorities – above all in order to evaluate their translation into real policy changes 
– must first overcome the rigid separation between ‘sectoral’ and ‘place-based’ policies that has long 
dominated EU policies (and their analysis). While some policies may be considered "space neutral"  
in terms of both their intent and outcomes– for example competition policies – others, albeit neutral in 
their intent – as in the case of the CAP – exhibit a considerable spatial impact (Duhr et al. 2010). And 
it is thanks to this common spatial outcome that a comprehensive analysis can be undertaken of 
regional and agricultural policies so that not only can "non-coordination cost" be quantified (Robert et 
al. 2001) but also the real progress made towards coordination evaluated as a result of changes in the 
allocation mechanisms and in the composition of Community spending. 
2.1 Agricultural policies from the "old" sectoral paradigm to territorial centrality. 
2.1.1  First Pillar CAP 
From  its  institution,  CAP  should  –notwithstanding  its  sectoral  policy  nature  –  have  pursued  an 
approach whereby the measures taken reflected the fact that agriculture is as an integral part of the 
economy therefore recognising that specific sectoral problems could not be resolved by measures 
exclusively addressed to the agricultural sector (European Commission, 1968). However, excessive 
emphasis on support for agricultural markets along with the very marginal role of the measures in 
support of agrarian structures that characterized the first 20 years of the CAP, produced significant 
imbalances in the distribution of financial resources. In the 1980s, the RICAP study (Commission of 
the European Community, 1981) which examined the impact of CAP resources on the European 
regions  NUTS1  in  the  preceding  20  year  period,  warned  of  a  trend  towards  the  polarisation  of 
agricultural  incomes  generated  by  CAP  spending  and  forewarned  against  its  potentially  perverse 
impact in terms of "distributive equity". And it is precisely the lack of equity within the sector and 
across territories that was identified as one of the principal "failures" of the CAP intervention model 
(Barbero et al. 1984; European Commission, 1985).  
                                                             
4‘Economic, social and territorial cohesion will remain at the heart of the Europe 2020 strategy (…). Cohesion policy and its 
structural  funds,  while  important  in  their  own  right,  are  key  delivery  mechanisms  to  achieve  the  priorities  of  smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth in Members States and regions’ (European Commission 2010a p.20) 
5 ‘The European Agriculture Rural Development Fund (EARDF or Rural fund) and the European  Fisheries Fund (EFF or 
Fisheries fund), which financed interventions for these two fields of action, were moved out of the realm of cohesion policy 
and included under “agricultural policy” and “fisheries policy” respectively, although most of their interventions are inspired 
by principles similar to those of cohesion policy’ (European Commission 2009, p.61) 
6 ‘Together, the present set of policy measures results in what is the main contribution of the CAP – a territorially and 
environmentally balanced EU agriculture within an open economic environment.’ (European Commission 2010b, p.4)   7 
A profound overhaul of the CAP commenced with the Mac Sharry reform of 1992 and continued with 
Agenda 2000 (1999), the Fischler reform (2003) and, finally, the Health Check (2008). These reforms 
made a considerable impact upon the financial weight of the various types of spending and attempts to 
change the foregoing imbalances. Moreover, it also led to the replacement of the original European 
Agricultural  Guidance  &  Guarantee  Fund  (EAGGF)  with  two  new  distinct  funds:  the  first,  the 
European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) for financing market measures, and the second, the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) designed to finance rural development 
programmes (RDP) according to a place-based approach. However, the impact of successive changes 
in the organisation and financial structure of the CAP on the real territorial distribution of resources is 
not  altogether  clear.  Tarditi  and  Zanias  (2001)  highlighted  a  recurrent  problem  of  equitable 
distribution as between the beneficiaries of the policy (whereby 80% of the beneficiaries receive less 
than  20%  of  the  overall  payments
7)  which  remained  unchanged  within  the  EU15  until  2006 
(Velazquez, 2008). On the other hand, the most disappointing feature of the Mac Sharry reform, 
which set into motion the CAP reform, was precisely the problem of redistribution insofar as the 
calculation of (direct) payments per hectare was based upon a "compensatory" criterion that was also 
retained in Agenda 2000. Furthermore, even in successive reforms the redistribution question was 
never  handled  head-on  and  in,  any  case,  still  remains  heavily  dependant  upon  the  decisions  of 
individual member states (Chatellier and Guyomard, 2010). The ESPON study (2004) finally threw 
full  light  upon  the  spatial  implications  of  this  enduring  distributive  iniquity.  Using  much  more 
detailed spatial disaggregation data than previous studies, revealed the anti-cohesion impact of first-
pillar CAP spending, which was only potentially mitigated by the then fledgling rural development 
measures (Shucksmith et al. 2005). The analyses by Bivand and Brundstad (2003) continued in the 
same direction and using more sophisticated spatial econometric techniques highlighted the negative 
impact  of  CAP  payments  on  the  economic  convergence  processes  taking  place  between  the  EU 
regions in the 1990s. Esposti (2007) with reference to the same time period also underlined how the 
enormous  volume  of  CAP  spending  had  no  positive  effect  upon  regional  growth,  although  not 
constituting  "counter-treatment"  with  respect  to  the  new  regional  policies.  However,  requests  for 
greater  equity  and  coordination  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  the  policy  into  line  with  the  Lisbon 
strategy were also largely ignored in the successive Fischler reform as far as first pillar spending was 
concerned, and were only partially met in the second-pillar reform (Esposti, 2007). Furthermore, with 
reference to the CAP trend foreseen after 2013, existing analyses concur in emphasising the risk of a 
fundamental  conflict  between  the  effects  of  agricultural  intervention  and  the  objectives  of  the 
cohesion policy
8 (Bureau and Mahè, 2008).  
The capacity on the part of CAP to progress towards intervention models that take due account of its 
spatial nature is made extremely difficult by interactions between "path dependency" and "temporal 
resilience". In the first place, the essential components defining the CAP go back to the origins of the 
European integration process, when present-day priorities of social and territorial cohesion were not 
fully developed. The principle of cohesion first saw the light with the Single European Act (1986) and 
was  only  "formally"  incorporated  into  CAP  objectives  in  the  latest  programming  period  (Esposti 
2008),  while  the  territorial  implementation  of  the  principle  is  even  more  recent
9.  Moreover,  the 
distribution of agricultural spending (with reference to the first pillar) – notwithstanding the changes 
made to CAP instruments and the new roles and functions attributed to agriculture – is still linked to 
the old logic of price support and the Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets. In other words, 
the CAP’s sectoral vocation is still far from being a regional vision. The sectoral vocation of the 
policy is directly proportional to the recourse made to historic models by each Member State (since 
2005) for the calculation of de-coupled direct payments: the higher the reliance on historical criteria 
                                                             
7 […] 80% of the support provided by FEOGA is devoted to 20% of farms that also account for the greater part 
of  the  land  used  in  agriculture”.  Communication  of  the  Commission  to  the  Council,  COM(91):  The 
Development and Future of the CAP, Reflection Paper, Brussels, February 1, 1991. 
8 ‘First-pillar measures of the CAP – which account for most of the budget – do not contribute much to the 
cohesion’ (Bureau and Mahe’, p.5) objectives, given the uneven nature of their benefits across countries, regions 
and sectors. 
9 The territorial cohesion objective was formally introduced into the CAP with the Green Paper on Territorial 
Cohesion: Turning Territorial Diversity into Strength (European Commission 2008)   8 
the stronger the perpetuation of the pre-existing distribution of financial resources based on strictly 
sectoral criteria (Bureau e Mahè, 2008). 
2.1.2 Rural Development 
The growing awareness of first-pillar CAP’s potentially perverse redistributive effects supported the 
idea that this distortion originates in the ‘disembedding of agriculture from regional and local context’ 
(Gallent et al. 2008, p. 108), which accentuates the concentration of the policy's benefits upon a few 
major producers situated in more economically dynamic rural areas. The vitality of rural areas cannot 
be  determined  exclusively  by  the  modernisation  of  its  agricultural  structures  while  the  growing 
diversification of economic activities in rural areas calls for a response able to satisfy needs with an 
increasingly territorial (Saraceno, 2002) and "place-based" approach. This awareness has also been 
enhanced with the recognition by the parts involved in the political debate of a need for greater 
integration between the various areas of Community policy, as acknowledged by the first reform of 
the structural funds (European Commission 1988)
10. This, therefore, is the context in which a series of 
innovations have come to fruition, such as the coordinated and joint exploitation of Community funds 
(ERDF,  EDF,  EAGF  –  GUIDANCE,  FIFG),  multi-year  programming,  and  the  concentration  of 
measures upon priority objectives and additionality. Nevertheless, the territorial component continues 
to occupy a marginal position with respect to other policy objectives that have instead emphasised the 
modernisation  of  agricultural  structures  thereby  forfeiting  potential  territorial  synergies  and  inter-
sectoral complementarity that rural areas require (Saraceno, 2002). With the formulation of Agenda 
2000 the need for the territorial integration of agricultural policies became more apparent. And on this 
issue, the European Conference on rural development held in Cork in 1996 “Rural Europe – Future 
Perspectives” (1996), confirmed that action was necessary as regards:  a further reinforcement of rural 
development policy; the relevance of rural areas in the framework of cohesion policies; the need for a 
multidisciplinary  and  multi-sectoral  approach  calibrated  upon  the  territorial  dimension;  and  the 
concentration of resources. This then was the phase that inaugurated a more systematic approach to 
rural development policies in an attempt to rationalise and reorganise all the instruments within a 
single  second-pillar  CAP  container.  Unfortunately,  the  mere  juxtaposition  of  a  set  of  highly 
heterogeneous measures under the same label in obedience to a political compromise only underlined 
the predominance of the sectoral function within the framework of rural development more apparent 
(De Filippis and Storti 2002). In point of fact, Agenda 2000 introduced a two-track rural development 
programming system designed for Objective 1 regions and regions outside Objective 1. In the former, 
the integration with structural fund programming, and the structural measures financed within the 
framework of the regional operational programmes (ROP) of the EAGF – GUIDANCE remained in 
place, while their accompanying measures formed part of a separate programming procedure linked to 
Rural  Development  Programmes  (RSP)  and  financed  by  the  EAGF  –  GUARANTEE
11.  The  regions 
outside  Objective  1,  instead,  were  limited  to  a  single  programming  procedure  through  the  RSP 
entirely financed by the GUARANTEE fund. This double track approach highlights some important 
limitations. For example, with respect to Objective 1 regions, it has prevented the  identification of a 
single source of financing and accentuated the detachment of structural measures from the financial 
measures  of  the  GUARANTEE  fund,  thereby  causing  the  latter  to  become  part  of  a  separate 
programming  procedure.  However,  the  system  managed  to  maintain  an  integrated  approach  with 
Structural Fund programming, which was lacking in the regions outside Objective 1. 
In the 2007-2003 programming  period, the EAGF – GUIDANCE and part of the specific resources of 
the EAGF – GUARANTEE earmarked for rural development were absorbed by a new fund for rural 
development, namely the European Agricultural Rural Development Fund (EARDF) which finances 
all measures to promote rural development that fall outside the legal framework of cohesion policy. 
This  new  reorganisation  zeroed  interrelations  between  the  rural  development  policy  and  regional 
policies, and consolidated the reform process within the framework of the CAP. Even if the (EC) 
regulation n° 1698/2005 (article 5) lays down that RDPs must be in line with the objectives of the 
                                                             
10 1988 was an important year: it determined the foundations for both regional policy and rural development 
policy, which will guide both action and Community interventions in successive programming periods. 
11 The areas subsumed under Objective 2 were allowed to maintain integrated programming through the Single 
Programming Documents – SPDs. In this regard an interesting exception is constituted by French programming 
2000-2006, with over twenty SPDs.   9 
other funds (such as for example competitiveness and cohesion) and that their contribution to the 
attainment  of  Community  priorities  should  be  evaluated  (Esposti,  2008):  ‘the  most  widespread 
concern is with the separation of the Rural Development component of the Agriculture-Rural Fund 
(EARDF) from the whole of cohesion policy’ (Barca 2009, p.162). Having ascertained the difficulty – 
for the foregoing reasons – of making first-pillar CAP spending functional for measures pursuing 
social and territorial cohesion purposes, the debate remains concentrated on the advantages from a 
cohesion standpoint of shifting resources towards rural development intervention measures that have a 
territorial and place-based nature. The empirical analysis conducted in this paper will evaluate the real 
significance of such opportunities. 
2.2 Regional Policies and economic and territorial cohesion: no axiomatic nexus. 
The Single European Act (1986) endowed cohesion policy with its own legal basis and assigned it the 
objective of reducing development disparities between the various European regions. As such this 
policy  is  "spatial"  in  both  its  intention  and  outcome  insofar  as  characterised  by  a  place-based 
approach. However, its real contribution towards the cohesion process – i.e. an effective capacity to 
address the factors of regional disadvantage – can certainly not be taken for granted in the light of the 
significant distortions that characterise its institutional development and implementation. 
As regards the institutional development of cohesion policy, its turning point, namely when it ceased 
to  be  a  simple  instrument  coordinating  national  development  policies
12  (e.g.  in  the  area  of  big 
transnational infrastructures where the need for such coordination is stronger) and became a truly 
Community-level policy, coincided with the accession to the then European Community of Denmark, 
the  United  Kingdom  and  Ireland.  If  the  accession  of  these  three  new  countries  (and  Ireland  in 
particular),  sharpened  the  degree  of  existing  disparities,    the  key  political  pressure  for  the 
establishment of the Community Cohesion policy came from the UK, which put this issue  at the 
centre of accession negotiations with the EC. “In a Community whose budget was heavily skewed 
towards  the  support  of  continental  agriculture,  the  UK,  with  less  than  2  per  cent  of  its  working 
population active in the primary sector, considered the establishment of a Regional Fund as a way of 
recovering some of the payments delivered to the EC budget” (Rodriguez-Pose, 2002 p.44). In the 
1980s, the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal emphasized both Union-wide regional disparities 
and the demand for a more favourable redistribution of financial resources through the EU budget 
since  their  agricultural  specialisation  patterns  prevented  them  from  taking  full  advantage  of  the 
Agricultural Policy that was then in place in the EU. These new members of the Union (together with 
Ireland) used their bargaining power within the EU to increase the expenditure in favour of “poor 
regions” and “offset the burden of the single market for southern countries and other less favoured 
regions” (European Commission’s http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/intro/regions2_en.htm).   
The increase in the resources devoted to regional policies was justified as a compensation for the 
asymmetric  distribution  of  the  socio-economic  costs  of  the  process  of  integration  that  seemed  to 
sharpen territorial disparities, which, in turn, would have been a source of tension among member 
states (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000; Batchler and Wren 2006). Since then, the growth (in absolute 
and relative terms) of structural spending has gone hand-in-hand with a further integration of the EU 
and its subsequent enlargements. However, as Baldwin and Wyplosz (2006) put it, “since 1994 the 
connection between poor nations and structural spending has been greatly diluted (as) large parts of 
Finland and Sweden were designated as eligible, and even some Austrian regions, together with all of 
the former East Germany”(paragraph 242). In the period 1994-1999, over one half of the Community 
population was situated in areas earmarked for support, despite the commitment towards a greater 
concentration of funds. This, together with the pressure exercised by the research for new resources to 
finance the eastward enlargement of the Union, was the motor behind the pursuit of more effective 
Community interventions by further concentrating resources and continuing the simplification process 
(Armstrong  2001).  Nevertheless,  the  need  for  a  greater  concentration  of  Community  spending 
continued to emerge in the debate on regional policies in successive programming periods. The Third 
Cohesion  Report  (Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  2004)  targeted  concentration, 
                                                             
12  The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was initially designed as a subsidiary source of financing 
for  national  policies  and  allocated  on  the  basis  of  a  system  of  national  quotas  that  emphasized  its 
“compensatory” nature rather than being translated into a truly supranational policy.   10 
programming    and  partnership  as  the  "key  principles  for  improving  the  efficiency  of  structural 
spending, while emphasising that ‘the evaluations’ (of regional policy) suggested that Community 
resources were often still allocated to an excessively high number of beneficiaries and in relative 
limited amounts" (p.22). 
This  theme  was  also  invoked  for  the  2007-2013  programming  period  in  the  debate  on  cohesion 
policies, when the convenience of a further concentration of financial resources upon the countries 
and regions most in need of structural support was reiterated. The concentration was to be obtained by 
reinforcing the principle of devolving cohesion policies towards the regions and local communities 
(Wren  2005;  Wren  and  Taylor  1999).  The  debate  centred  upon  the  design  of  the  reform,  which 
primarily revised the priority objectives, the financial instruments and the allocation of resources 
between the priority objectives. In the framework of this debate, the principle of concentration was 
attributed considerable importance (Batchtler and Polverari 2007; Crescenzi 2009).  
As  concerns  the  impact  of  the  EU's  regional  policy  on  the  objective  of  economic  and  territorial 
cohesion, the empirical evidence is somewhat contradictory. A large part of these studies whether 
neoclassical in their approach (Boldrin and Canova 2001), or inspired by the perspective of the "New 
Growth Theory" (Magrini 1999) or adopting the standpoint of the New Economic Geography (Martin 
1999; Puga 2002), highlight the very limited or non-existent impact of the EU regional policies on the 
convergence process, and stress the fundamental distortion of market equilibria. Some more recent 
contributions,  which  adopt  theoretical  approaches  capable  of  evaluating  policies  in  terms  of  the 
interaction with a potentially much wider range of factors, while agreeing upon the limited nature of 
the policies' impact upon the degree of convergence, have proposed a more varied set of explanations 
for  their  findings.  Midelfart-Knarvic  and  Overman  (2002),  for  example,  stress  the  distortions 
produced  by  Structural  Funds  on  the  localisation  choices  made  by  companies  with  the  highest 
innovative  potential  (in  response  to  the  incentives  offered  by  the  localisation  policies  in 
"disadvantaged"  areas)  which  thereby  find  themselves  situated  in  areas  with  an  insufficient 
endowment of human capital, thus determining an incongruence between the demand for and the 
supply  of  skilled  labour.  With  the  same  close  attention  to  innovative  dynamics  but  from  a  neo-
Schumpeterian  viewpoint,  Cappellen  et  al.  (2003)  concluded  (somewhat  paradoxically)  that  the 
impact of Structural Funds essentially depended upon the receptor capacity of beneficiary regions, 
and that this impact was greater in relatively less disadvantaged areas. This result was confirmed from 
a neoclassical standpoint by Ederveen et al. 2006. However, diametrically opposing conclusions were 
reached by Beugelsdijk and Eijiffinger (2005), who after examining the institutional conditions of the 
recipient countries (rather than the single regions) concluded: ‘less clean countries (or as we measure 
it,  more  ‘corrupt’  countries)  of  the  current  EU-15  do  not  gain  less  economic  growth  from  the 
structural  funds’  (p.48).  Nonetheless,  Rodriguez-Pose  and  Fratesi  (2004)  evaluated  the  impact  of 
Structural Funds on the convergence process by distinguishing the role played by the various axes of 
intervention (the composition of spending). This approach enables us to highlight how an imbalanced 
distribution of funds (above all in favour of investments in transport infrastructures) represents an 
important explanation of the limited impact of the policy observed in the convergence analysis, thus 
showing how a priori distortions of the policies themselves can limit their effectiveness. Mohl and 
Hagen (2010) reviewed at least 15 other quantitative studies, which with similar approaches to those 
discussed above reached altogether conflicting conclusions on the impact of cohesion policies. 
The analysis of the institutional development of regional policies as also that of their ex-post impact 
clearly  demonstrate  that  the  compatibility  of  place-based  interventions  with  territorial  cohesion 
processes cannot be taken for granted and consequently should be the subject of careful empirical 
evaluation – which is precisely what this paper sets out to do. Moreover, this is particularly necessary 
when it comes to evaluating the manner and extent to which changes in the composition of overall 
Community spending from sectoral interventions in favour of explicitly place-based policies (not only 
through an increase in the overall budget quota reserved to cohesion policies in the strict sense of the 
term but also through the incorporation in the same framework of other types of intervention such as 
Rural Development interventions) contribute towards cohesion processes.   11 
3. In tandem for cohesion? The empirical analysis of a complex relationship 
As  discussed  earlier,  the  compatibility  of  the  three  areas  of  Community  policy  with  the  general 
objective of territorial cohesion is of increasing importance for Community policy makers. However – 
as our review of the literature indicates – there is no clear consensus on the contribution made towards 
the  cohesion  process  by  any  of  these  policies.  Existing  studies  –  with  differing  methodologies  – 
address the problem of evaluating the territorial impact of regional and agricultural policies by trying 
to come to grips with the problem of identifying an appropriate counterfactual ("What would have 
happened had the policy never been implemented?"). This problem becomes extremely important 
whenever a simultaneous and comparative evaluation is attempted of the contribution made to the 
regional growth processes by the different policies (such as the regional and agricultural policies). 
The impact of the different policies on economic processes takes place through various mechanisms 
that imply not only different timescales before any effects become apparent but also possible and 
differential "collateral effects". 
The difficulties raised by the construction of an appropriate counterfactual counselled us to take a 
different approach, especially when attempting, as in this work, to evaluate the synergies operating 
between the various policies. Thus our approach consists in evaluating the structure of a policy by 
analysing  the  manner  in  which  resources  are  assigned  to  objectives  in  order  to  determine  the 
correspondence  between  declared  intentions  and  resources  actually  earmarked  to  them.  In  other 
words, this is an analysis of the a priori structure of policies rather than an attempt at evaluating their 
ex-post impact. It means concentrating our analysis on the spatial structure of the funds in relation to 
the various policy areas before the interventions associated with them were implemented. Therefore, 
the analysis is concerned with the outcome of the resource allocation process at the territorial level so 
as to evaluate both the spatial structure and its coherence with the geography of factors of structural 
disadvantage,  upon  whose  elimination  the  capacity  of  any  policy  to  promote  territorial  cohesion 
depends. 
In order to evaluate the a priori compatibility of Community fund allocation with territorial cohesion 
objectives, it is necessary – as asserted by the European Commission itself on the occasion of the 
successive reforms of regional policies – to analyse its degree of territorial concentration, i.e. the 
capacity to keep the effects of the policies within the areas subject to intervention by ring-fencing 
spillovers,  as  far  as  possible,  within  the  disadvantaged  areas  (Dall’Erba  2005)  and,  therefore, 
maximising the potential impacts of the policies themselves. In point of fact such "external" effects 
represent an important component of the policy. "The benefits of the Structural Funds when viewed in 
isolation are modest, thus suggesting that the real long-term benefits depend upon the manner in 
which the disadvantaged economies react to the opportunities offered by the rest of the EU" (p.197). 
In the second place, the degree of compatibility of the three areas of Community policy with respect 
to the cohesion objectives can be evaluated in terms of the association between the actual allocation of 
financial resources and the regions' factors of structural disadvantage, which is "the measure" of a 
policy's capacity to direct its resources to where a concentration of disadvantage prevents regions 
from expressing their potential (Mairate 2006). An assessment of the correspondence between the 
geographies  of  structural  disadvantage  and  fund  allocation  is  necessary  if  we  are  to  evaluate  the 
existence of distortions that could, a priori, prevent the policy from achieving its specific objectives, 
thus confirming a broad and generalised trend on the part of "spatial" policies to "lose territorial 
focus" over time (Greenbaum and Bondonio 2004), thereby frustrating the benefits of a place-based 
approach  and  resurrecting  the  equitable  distribution  problem  associated  with  the  "old  sectoral 
paradigm”.  
3.1 Methodology and the empirical analysis model 
An  analysis  of  the  regional  allocation  of  Community  funds  for  Regional  Policies,  and  Rural 
Development and agricultural policies will enable us to perform empirical tests upon: 
a)  potential inconsistencies/conflicts in the allocation of funds as between the various policies 
(composition of expenditure and territorial coordination); 
b)  the coherence between the various policies and the principle of territorial concentration  (the 
spatial structure of spending);   12 
c)  the  (potential)  capacity  of  the  policies  to  further  the  cohesion  process  through  their 
association with factors of structural disadvantage (coherence with territorial cohesion). 
The analysis of the spatial structure will be performed through the calculation of an autocorrelation 
index (Moran’s I). Moran’s I is calculated using the formula: 
              (1) 
Where wij is a sequence of  normalised weights that relates the observation (region) i to all the other 
observations (regions) j in the dataset. If the I index values are greater (lower) than the expected value 
E(I)=-1/(n-1) this will denote a positive (negative) autocorrelation. 
In the empirical analysis conducted in this article, the element wij of the weight matrix is:  
                      (2) 
where dij is the linear distance between region i and region j. 
 
 
To answer questions a) and c) the following regression model for panel data is specified: 
         (3) 
 
where: 
  is the per-capita spending at the regional level for the various policies: Regional, Rural      
    Development and first-pillar CAP; 
    is the index of structural disadvantage of the regions calculated with the Principal Components 
    Analysis (PCA); 
    is the per-capita spending in  OTHER areas of Community policy other than y 
    are fixed individual effects: the non-observable features of regions that impact upon the al 
    location of funds but which remain invariant over time;  
    is the temporal trend  
    is idiosyncratic error 
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And where  i represents the region and t the programming  period (94-99, 2000-06, 2007-13) and t-1 
for the Index of Structural Disadvantage is the year preceding each programming period (i.e. 1993, 
1999 and 2006 respectively). 
The  estimate  of  parameter  ,  therefore,  indicates  the  funds'  capacity  to  target  the  most 
disadvantaged  regions  of  the  European  Union  thereby  promoting  economic  convergence.  A 
significant and positive value of parameter   would denote a systematic association between the 
structural disadvantage of the European regions and the "intensity" of the support provided by the 
various policies. This association offers a measure of the compatibility of policies – regardless of their 
different specific functions – with the more general objective of territorial cohesion. Vice-versa, the 
lack  of  significance  for  this  coefficient  would  suggest  a  substantially  "neutral"  distribution  of 
Community  resources  from  the  territorial  viewpoint  and  potentially  in  conflict  with  the  cohesion 
objectives announced by Community policy makers as discussed above. The estimate of parameter 
, on the other hand, is a measure of the trade-offs or synergies operating between different policy 
areas. A significant negative value of this parameter would suggest that a "compensatory" mechanism 
is at work among the policies thus maintaining a substantial equilibrium as between the transfers 
received from the various regions of the Union. On the contrary, a positive value of this parameter 
would suggest a trend in the funds of the different policies towards targeting the same areas with a 
"cumulative"  and/or  "knock-on”  process  among  the  policies.  In  addition,  the  estimation  of  an 
interaction term between structural disadvantage and the funds allocated for the various policies will 
make it possible to evaluate if this cumulative effect among the policies coincides with the most 
disadvantaged areas (suggesting the presence of "pro-cohesion" synergies) or if it is linked to the 
capacity of the regions to attract funds from different policies by virtue of characteristics other than 
their being disadvantaged. 
The  structural  disadvantage  index  of  the  regions  ( )  is  defined  on  the  basis  of  those  structural 
characteristics  of  regional  economies  that  the  economic  literature  as  a  whole  associates  (either 
singularly  or  in  various  combinations)  with  a  reduced  or  non-existent  capacity  to  converge  upon 
levels of growth and development that characterise the "heart" of the EU (Boschma 2004; Budd and 
Hirmis 2004; Cheshire and Magrini 2000;  Huggins 2009a; Pike et al. 2006; Rodriguez-Pose 1998a 
and  b).  Such  features  refer  to  three  principal  dimensions:  the  accumulation  of  human  capital 
(Lundvall 1992; Malecki 1997; Crescenzi 2005; Huggins 2009b), the productive use of such capital in 
terms  of  the  demand  for  and  supply  of  specific  sectoral  skills    (Gordon,  2001)  and  the  overall 
endowment of basic infrastructures (Chancre e Thompson 2000; Crescenzi and Rodriguez-Pose 2008) 
which makes the circulation and productive utilisation of regional resources possible. Each of these 
possible sources of structural disadvantage finds justification in different strands of the literature on 
the economic performance of the regions. Thus while the neoclassical approach has given greatest 
emphasis to the role played by physical capital endowments (public and private) in improving the 
productivity of a local factors, the latest theories linked to "endogenous growth" draw attention to the 
importance of human capital and its "qualitative" composition (in terms of skill composition) in line 
with – and especially as regards the latter feature – the literature on the operation of global markets at 
local levels and upon the determinants of the spatial concentration of unemployment. The synergies 
between  the  different  theoretical  approaches  have  been  exploited  in  some  recent  contributions 
(Crescenzi  and  Rodriguez-Pose  2009;  Crescenzi  et  al  2007;  Kitson  et  al.  2004),  which  were 
specifically designed to integrate various theoretical contributions in order, first and foremost , to 
identify empirically, the factors impeding not only the innovative capacity of European regions but 
also their growth. The simultaneous presence of various factors of "socio-economic disadvantage" 
constitutes a permanent obstacle to the long-term development of the European regions (as also those 
of the United States). The effectiveness of regional development policies therefore depends upon their 
capacity to "target" in an "equilibrated" fashion all these factors simultaneously. For this reason the 
capacity of the EU policies to re-distribute Community financial resources, in a manner more or less 
compatible with the general objective of territorial cohesion, has been empirically tested by evaluating 
the  relationship  between  structural  disadvantage  –  i.e.  the  simultaneous  presence  of  factors  of 
disadvantage in all the dimensions discussed earlier – and the funds earmarked to each region. The 
distributive  mechanisms  of  a  policy  are,  therefore,  deemed  "virtuous"  from  the  point  of  view  of 
territorial cohesion whenever they manage to channel a greater volume of resources towards the most   14 
deserving areas in structural terms, i.e. those where structural disadvantage is highest. This criterion 
applies independently of the evaluation of the impact of the single policies. Different policies propose 
different  objectives  and,  therefore,  impact  on  different  factors  (ranging  from  the  safeguarding  of 
agricultural  prices  for  the  first  pillar  CAP  to  the  formation  of  human  capital  for  some  regional 
development  programmes).  However,  the  overall  geography  of  the  distribution  of  Community 
resources  has  a  consistent  impact  on  the  most  general  processes  of  cohesion  and  economic 
convergence through synergies or conflicts that arise between various policy areas. Therefore, an 
assessment of the capacity of Community redistributive mechanisms to channel resources towards 
structural  disadvantage  constitutes  an  a  priori  measure  of  their  general  compatibility  with  the 
requirement of territorial cohesion. In addition the empirical analysis of the evolution over time of the 
relationship between disadvantage and funds received by the regions enables us to evaluate how both 
successive reforms of allocation and intervention mechanisms and the shifting of resources from one 
policy area to another have modified the relationship between EU policies and cohesion. 
The  concept  of  Structural  Disadvantage  as  applied  to  the  European  regions  is  operationalised  by 
identifying  suitable  proxies  for  each  of  the  foregoing  three  "dimensions":  the  "Percentage  of  the 
Population with a Tertiary Educational Attainment" and the "Percentage of the Economically Active 
Population with a Tertiary Educational Attainment " are chosen as proxies for the accumulation of 
human  capital,  the  "  Long-Term  Unemployed  as  a  Percentage  of  All  Unemployed"  and  "the 
Percentage of the Economically Active Persons in Agriculture" (Federico 2005) are chosen as the 
proxy for the productive use of human capital and "Kilometres of Motorway per 1000 Inhabitants" is 
the proxy for basic infrastructural assets. The choice of these simple indicators is dictated by the 
limited availability of homogeneous statistical data for all the European regions commencing from 
1993, i.e. the year prior to the first programming period considered in this analysis. The information 
contained  in  the  variables  chosen  is  synthesised  as  a  single  indicator  (the  Index  of  Structural 
Disadvantage) by means of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) (Duntenam 1989; Joliffe 1986) 
whose  results,  set  out  in  Tables  A1  and  A2  in  Annex  A,  generate  the  Index  of  Structural 
Disadvantages used in the following analysis. The eigenanalysis of the correlation matrix shows that 
the first principal component alone is able to account for around 50 percent of the total variance 
(Table A2). The first principal component scores are computed from the standardised value of the 
original  variables  by  using  the  coefficients  listed  under  ‘Component  1’  in  Table  A-1.  These 
coefficients assign a large positive weight to educational achievement and infrastructure endowment; 
these  are  major  components  of  the  socio-economic  tissue  of  the  regions.  A  negative  weight  is 
assigned, instead, to the long term component of unemployment and to the percentage of agricultural 
labour. This first Principal Component (‘Component 1’) - that explains 50% of the total variance of 
the  original  indicators  -  constitutes  the  “Index  of  Structural  Disadvantage”  introduced  into  the 
regression analysis as an aggregate proxy for the structural disadvantage of each region. The index is 
calculated for each year t-1 preceding each programming period holding constant the PCA weights 
(calculated  on  the  longitudinal  data
13).  This  should  minimize  the  potential  endogeneity  between 
allocated  financial  resources  and  regional  disadvantage  and,  at  the  same  time,  account  for  the 
conditions observed by the policy-makers when allocating the funds.  
3.2 A single territorial databank for Community spending from 1994 to 2013. 
The analysis carried out in this article is based upon an innovative databank developed for this paper 
and containing information on the first and second pillar of the CAP and the Structural Funds of 
regional policy in the last three programming periods (1994-1999, 2000-2006 and 2007-2013) that 
referred to the member states of the EU15, and represented approximately 90% of overall Community 
spending over the last 20-year period. To our knowledge such a complete and territorially detailed 
coverage of Community spending is unprecedented in the existing literature. 
The  data  contained  in  the  databank  are  aggregate  data  at  the  level  of  the  relevant  administrative 
authorities in the framework of the policies considered. Obviously, the administrative level of interest 
to us (i.e. the authority managing an operative or rural development programme) will vary from one 
                                                             
13 Before implementing this procedure we tested the stationarity of the variables. The tests confirmed the 
stationarity of the series as discussed in footnote 23, allowing us to implement the PCA analysis on the panel 
dataset.      15 
Member State to another according to how the responsibilities for agriculture, rural development and 
regional policies are distributed. Therefore, if in general terms the information gathered contributes 
towards the establishment of a homogenously regionalised databank, expenditure data are organised 
with reference to different territorial levels (NUTS levels)14 in different member states. 
The information gathered constitutes the sum of the resources directly funded by the European Union. 
Consequently, financial resources deriving from national financing do not form part of the databank 
used for the analysis. There are two reasons for this: first, the analysis sets out to establish an a priori 
geographical allocation of resources spent rather than their territorial impact; second, as we wish to 
draw attention to the structures of the negotiated policies at a Community level, co-financing would 
modify the relations between the first-pillar CAP, which does not envisage a national contribution, 
and the second pillar CAP and the Structural Funds. 
The timescale considered is characterised by an evolutionary trend involving objectives assigned to 
policies, financial instruments and types of programming, as illustrated in the following table 1. As 
concerns  the  first  pillar  of  the  CAP  existing  literature  has  encountered  considerable  difficulty  in 
obtaining  consolidated  data  on  agriculture  for  the  EU15  regions  and  for  a  relatively  long  time 
intervals. Some criticism has also been made in recent years on account of the fragmentation and 
quality  of  publicly  available  expenditure  data,  notwithstanding  the  “European  Transparency 
Initiative” (Reg. (EC) n° 1290/2005) that requires member states to annually publish the beneficiaries 
of appropriations made from the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the European 
Agricultural Rural Development Fund
15. To overcome these limitations, first-pillar CAP data have 
been processed in this work in an innovative manner based on the Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN) databank, while the financial appropriations actually allocated to each territorial unit have 
been utilised for rural development and regional policy. (See annex B for a detailed discussion of the 
procedures followed for the development of this section of the databank. Additional information is 
available in Crescenzi and Pierangeli 2010 that includes an extensive discussion of this databank). 
In the framework of rural development, as noted earlier, interventions were financed not only by the 
EAGGF guarantee section but also by the EAGGF guidance section up until the last programming 
period when the resources were merged into a single fund (EAFRD). As regards both the 1994-1999 
programming period and Agenda 2000, the data referring to rural development policy come from two 
sources: DG REGIO, for data on EAGF guidance, which comprise the operating programmes and the 
Leader+  programmes;  DG  AGRI
16  for  data  on  EAGF-guarantee.  In  the  2007-2013  programming 
period, the EAFRD data derived from the single programming instruments of the EU15 member 
states
17. 
Structural Fund data were derived from an ad hoc dataset provided by the Directorate General for 
Regional Policy of the European Commission (DG REGIO) in May 2009. For each programming 
period  and  for  each  single  fund  the  country,  programme  reference  code,  programme  title  (which 
indicates the reference region) together with spending allocated, committed, paid and the relative 
performance have been set forth. Therefore the databank contains all such information on each single 
programme referring to each management authority. 
Altogether  the  databank  comprises  about  3000  observations  that  specify  the  estimate  of  actual 
expenditure  (for  the  first-pillar)  and  the  funds  allocated  (for  the  Structural  Funds  and  rural 




14  Regions  in  Belgium,  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom  are  classed  at  NUTS1  level  while  Denmark,  Ireland  and 
Luxembourg have no sub-national divisions: for the remaining EU15 member states expenditure has been classified at the 
NUTS2 level.  
15 AgraFacts  n.35/09. 
16 The data derive from the PSRs of the EU15 (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rur/countries/index_en.htm). 
17 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rur/countries/index_en.htm 
18 With reference to the financial instruments that require multi-year financing at the administrative authority (AA) level, the 
number of programming documents requested has progressively declined over time: the number of observations fell from 
about 1,700 units in the period 1994-1999 (but excluding the interventions financed by EAGF guidance for accompanying 
measures)  to  340  in  the  period  2007-2013.  This  contraction  clearly  shows  a  thoroughgoing  process  of  programming 
simplification  and  the  concentration  of  objectives  that  the  Commission  set  itself  and  pursued  during  the  programming 
periods.   16 
EUROSTAT was the source of the data on the structural characteristics of the regions that we used for 
the computation of the Structural Disadvantage Index. 
3.3  The  structure  of  fund  allocation  for  European  region  Community  policies:  empirical 
evidence 
By following the methodology illustrated in the foregoing paragraph, it is possible to analyse the 
structure  of  Community  resources  distributed  among  the  European  regions  according  to  the 
information contained in the databank on spending decisions for EU regional, rural development and 
agricultural policies. For the purpose of evaluating the capacity of the single policies to contribute in a 
coordinated manner towards the objective of territorial cohesion we shall first, therefore, commence 
with an analysis of the correlation of regional spending for the various policies and in the various 
programming  periods,  which  will  also  serve  the  purpose  of  evaluating  persistence  in  regional 
spending allocations. Second, we shall examine the spatial structure of such spending in order to 
analyse  the  degree  of  territorial  concentration.  The  analysis  of  the  association  between  structural 
disadvantage  and  EU  funds  will,  instead,  be  entrusted  to  an  estimate  of  the  model  illustrated  in 
equation 3. 
3.3.1 Expenditure correlations by policy area 
Table 2 sets out a preliminary analysis of the simple correlations (and of their statistical significance) 
between  per  capita  expenditure  at  a  regional  level  for,  respectively,  the  regional  policies,  rural 
development and first-pillar CAP in the three programming  periods considered (1994-1999; 2000-
2006; 2007-2013). If we observe the correlation between expenditure allocations for the same policy 
in successive programming periods we can evaluate the level of persistence over time of the policy 
itself in the distribution of its resources at a territorial level. The analysis of persistence in regional 
expenditure allocations enables us to make a first evaluation of the territorial impact of the reforms 
that succeeded one another over time in the various Community policy frameworks. This concerns not 
only  the  shift  in  financial  resources  from  one  policy  area  to  another  (composition),  but  also  the 
application  of  the  principle  of  the  geographical  concentration  of  resources  that  was  energetically 
pursued in the framework of regional policy (allocation), especially in the first two programming  
periods (1994-99 and 2000-06)
19, despite the potential eligibility of all Community territory for rural 
development measures ushered in by Agenda 2000. Both regional policies and first-pillar CAP exhibit 
a high level of persistence in the regional allocation of funds between programming  periods: for 
regional policies a 97% correlation was found between the programming period 94-99 and that of 
2000-2006, and a 92.5% correlation between the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 programming  periods; as 
regards the regionalised spending of first-pillar CAP the correlation was respectively 94% and 93 %, a 
sign of the ongoing link between present-day agricultural policy and the "old" market policy (in terms 
of  regional  distribution  as  well  as  final  beneficiaries,  as  seen  in  paragraph  2.1.1,  and  even  with 
intervention  instruments  that  were  clearly  less  distortive  than  in  the  past).  As  regards  rural 
development policies it was possible to observe a relatively higher level of dynamism over time, as 
indicated by the correlations between successive periods of, respectively, 64% between 94-99 and 
2000-2006; and 80% between 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. The impact of Agenda 2000 seems to be 
well  established,  which  if,  on  the  one  hand,  had  the  merit  of  introducing  a  more  organic  rural 
development policy, on the other, was responsible for its "dilution" by suppressing rural zones as 
areas of specific intervention, and including within a single container tools of differentiated nature 
with a strong emphasis on interventions with an agricultural sectoral function. 
By referring to Table 2 we can evaluate the level of correlation between the various policy areas in the 
same  programming  period  as  well  as  its  evolution  over  time  so  as  to  evaluate  the  degree  of 
complementarity/substitutability between different EU policies. In this context a significant reduction 
in  the  correlation  of  regional  level  spending  between  regional  policies  and  rural  development  is 
immediately evident: from 80% in the period 94-99, it falls to 59% in the period 2000-06 and to 50% 
in the period 2007-13, thus suggesting that these two policy areas are progressively moving apart. As 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
19 The share of the population of the 15 member states that benefit from objectives 1 and 2 declined from 51% to a level of 
about 40%.    17 
mentioned before, it seems that the origin of this process can be found in Agenda 2000, and that it has 
been reinforced during the present programming  period, probably on account of the "abandonment" 
of the integrated programming approach. The association with other policy areas is inferior in relative 
terms but substantially stable over time. Therefore the differential persistence over time of the various 
policies can be associated with an evolution in their reciprocal relations in response to successive 
reform processes. 
3.3.2. Coherence with the territorial concentration principle 
The  analysis  of  the  correlation  between  regional  allocations  for  the  same  policy  in  successive 
programming periods and between different policies in the same time period has brought to light a 
complex equilibrium between persistence and compensation in the relations between the various areas 
of Community policy. However, in order to throw light on the relationship between equilibria among 
policies and their potential compatibility with the objective of territorial cohesion, it is necessary to 
study  the  distribution  of  their  financial  resources  in  space  and  their  capacity  for  geographical 
concentration in line with the structural disadvantage of regions. 
Table 3 illustrates the MORAN’S I Indices calculated on the basis of Equation 1 discussed earlier for 
each policy and programming  period and for the Structural Disadvantage index of the regions. The 
lack of spatial autocorrelation in the allocation of funds – with an I index close to the expected value, 
E(I), indicated in the table – would seem to point to an indiscriminate distribution of funds. On the 
contrary, a positive Moran I index that is significantly different from E(I) denotes the presence of a 
positive spatial autocorrelation: high spending areas are associated with a "neighbourhood" of areas 
with relatively high spending levels, in line with the principle of the "geographical concentration" of 
spending for the purpose of maximising its effectiveness in territorial terms. 
The Moran I index for regional policies points to there being a clear concentration of Community 
spending  that  tends  to  increase,  albeit  marginally,  in  response  to  successive  reforms  and  to  a 
progressive  reinforcement  of  the  criterion  of  the  territorial  concentration  of  spending.  Rural 
Development Policies, although exhibiting a level of territorial concentration considerably lower than 
that  of  the  regional  policies,  reveal  a  significant  increase  in  their  capacity  to  "focus"  financial 
resources upon specific areas of intervention, commencing from the last programming period. Despite 
the progressive "decoupling" from regional policies discussed earlier, the mechanisms to select the 
beneficiaries  of  the  policy  developed  for  the  2007-2013  programming  period  still  seem  able  to 
guarantee a higher level of territorial focus. On the other hand, the geography of first-pillar CAP 
spending– in line with the sectoral and non-territorial nature of this policy – exhibits a much lower 
degree of territorial concentration (and statistically less significant) with respect to rural development. 
Furthermore, this differential tends to widen in the period 2007-2013. 
In order to evaluate whether or not the degree of territorial concentration reached by the policies is 
suitable for tackling the persistent structural disadvantage of the economic "periphery" of the EU, it is 
necessary to compare the degree of spatial autocorrelation with that of the Structural Disadvantage 
Index. Structural disadvantage (Table 2) exhibits much more spatial concentration than Community 
funds,  which  should,  instead,  be  contributing  towards  attenuating  this  disadvantage,  thereby 
suggesting  the  need  to  move  towards  a  further  increase  in  the  territorial  concentration  of 
interventions. 
Altogether these results suggest that shifting resources from first-pillar CAP to Rural Development 
interventions can increase the coherence of overall Community spending in terms of the territorial 
concentration criterion, and potentially that the degree of coherence can move closer towards the 
degree of structural disadvantage of the regions. However, if the CAP is to contribute towards the 
achievement of the EU's long-term objectives, it does appear necessary to make an improvement in 
the distributive criteria from the standpoint of taking greater account of the economic and territorial 
disadvantages  that  characterise  the  context  in  which  agricultural  activity  is  performed.  Such  an 
improvement  is  especially  necessary  in  the  framework  of  rural  development  in  view  of  its  own 
specific territorial component, and could require a "reconsideration" of the integrated approach to 
multi-fund programming. 
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3.3.3 The association between funds received and structural disadvantage 
After analysing the spatial structure of Community resources, a more detailed assessment is required 
of the capacity of these funds  to develop reciprocal synergies (brought into question by the simple 
correlation  between  different  spending  areas)  and  to  target  the  more  disadvantaged  areas  more 
effectively by promoting processes of economic social and territorial cohesion. 
The  estimate  of  the  regression  model  specified  in  Equation  3  offers  a  systematic  analysis  of  the 
territorial structure of the Community funds. Table 4 sets out the results of the cross-section estimate 
of the empirical analysis model, which was estimated separately for each Community policy and each 
programming  period.  The  per  capita  spending  at  regional  level  for  each  Community  policy  is, 
therefore,  regressed  onto  the  Structural  Disadvantage  Index  discussed  above  and  onto  a  set  of 
"national" dummies whose purpose is to isolate any national "fixed effect": the systematic capacity of 
regions belonging to the same country to receive more (or less) funds regardless of their degree of 
disadvantage with respect to other areas of the Union.  
The results concerning Regional Policies (Table 4, columns 1-3) highlight a positive and statistically 
significant link between structural disadvantage and funds received by the regions. A higher degree of 
structural disadvantage is associated with a higher level of spending on regional policies regardless of 
the  country  to  which  the  region  belongs.  The  association  between  disadvantage  and  Community 
spending increased from 2000 as shown by an increase in the significance of the coefficient. The 
analysis of the coefficients associated with national dummy variables provides confirmation of the 
model’s explanatory power. The regions of post-unification Germany received (in the period 94-99) 
systematically higher level of financing with respect to the other regions, in addition to what would 
have  been  "justified"  by  their  degree  of  structural  disadvantage.  However,  this  effect  tends  to 
disappear in the successive programming periods. On the contrary, the "premium" for the regions of 
the  cohesion  countries,  Portugal,  Spain  and  Greece,  is  systematic  and  persistent  –  positive  and 
statistically  significant  in  all  programming  periods.  This  premium  is  provided  in  addition  to  the 
Cohesion Fund reserved for cohesion countries and Ireland, and from which the latter withdrew in 
January 2004
20. The data provide no confirmation, instead, of the hypothesis that a redistribution 
mechanism  operates  between  various  policy  contexts  so  as  to  systematically  favour  the  United 
Kingdom as "compensation" for the limited benefits obtained from the first pillar of the CAP
21. 
As regards Rural Development Policies (Table 4, columns 4-6) the association between funds and 
structural  disadvantage  appears  to  be  considerably  weaker  than  that  of  the  regional  policies,  and 
above all is found to wane over time commencing from the 2000-2006 programming period. This 
weakness also seems to underline the predominance of the sectoral function in the criteria used for 
distributing  resources  within  the  framework  of  rural  development.  Therefore,  the  progressive 
"decoupling" between the regional policies and rural development interventions, as observed in the 
preceding paragraph, is accompanied by a reduction in the association between the two policies and 
the  structural  disadvantage  of  the  regions  probably  due  to  the  abandonment  of  the  integrated 
programming among the various funds. If we consider the distribution of the "national premiums" 
implicit in the regional allocation of funds for Rural Development we shall, also in this case, find a 
mechanism for the assignment of premiums to cohesion countries (significant and positive national 
dummies in all programming  periods) that, furthermore, was later extended – commencing from the 
period 2000-2006 – to some economically strong countries such as Sweden, Finland and Austria; 
which may in part be explained by their possessing a high proportion of agricultural land classified as 
Less Favoured Areas (IEEP, 2006)
22. 
As concerns the first-pillar of the CAP (Table 4, columns 7-9) the association with disadvantage 
remains positive and significant, in line with the findings of Tarditi and Zanias 2001. However, the 
total variability in the regional allocation of funds as explained by the model (as indicated by the R-
square) is relatively limited and decreases with time. And as the following table clearly illustrates, this 
relationship disappears altogether when additional controls for the characteristics of the regions are 
                                                             
20 The Cohesion Fund has not been included in the databank as its resources are allocated at a the national level. 
21 The imbalance in the UK’s contribution position led to the Fontainbleau Agreement (1984) and the determination of a 
permanent rebate of its contribution towards the Community budget (De Filippis, Sardone, 2010). 
22 This is especially true for Austria and Finland which in 2005 accounted for 72% and 100% respectively of SAU (IEEP, 
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introduced into the model. Nevertheless, it is possible to ascertain that as regards the first-pillar – in 
line with our expectations – no "premium" mechanism is detectable in favour of countries on the EU's 
periphery, even if the initial penalisation of Portugal (found for the period 94-99) seems to have been 
corrected in successive periods. In addition, even the penalisation to which the Italian and British 
regions  were  subject  also  appear  to  have  disappeared  in  the  more  recent  programming    periods 
although in these same periods the "premium" for the French regions was reinforced. 
The  availability  of  regionalised  expenditure  data  for  the  three  consecutive  programming  periods 
enables us to make simultaneous use of both the cross-section and time-series variability of the data 
through the methodologies of panel data analysis. The estimation of the empirical analysis model in 
its  fixed  effects  panel  data  specifications  makes  it  possible  to  evaluate  the  relationship  between 
structural disadvantage and Community funds after controlling for all the specific characteristics of 
each region that are non-observable/non-measurable and invariant over time (fixed effects) and for all 
factors  common  to  all  regions  and  subject  to  development  over  time  (temporal  dummies).  This 
specification, therefore, allows us to evaluate the capacity of the various policies to target their funds 
upon structural disadvantage by removing from this relationship not only the effects of belonging to a 
certain country (as in the cross-section analysis discussed earlier) but also – for example – those of 
geographical  position,  historical  factors,  institutional  quality  (i.e.  the  general  capacity  of  local 
institutions to "attract" EU resources over and above their structural disadvantage), sectoral macro-
structure,  firm-size  structure  etc..  Table  5  sets  out  the  results  of  the  estimation  of  the  model  of 
empirical  analysis  as  specified  in  Equation  3,  estimated  with  two-way  fixed  effects  panel 
methodology
23. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 reveal a weak relationship between structural disadvantage and funds for 
Regional  Policies  after  controlling  for  the  time-invariant  characteristics  of  the  regions.  A  low 
correlation between funds and structural disadvantage that varies over time denotes a limited capacity 
on the part of regional policies to target the more structurally backward areas by tackling the factors 
of disadvantage that can develop over time. If we observe the relationship between various policy 
areas (column 2) it does not appear that any "compensatory" mechanism exists at a regional level 
between regional policies and the first pillar of the CAP: receiving an amount of funds that is higher 
(lower) with respect to the average in terms of first-pillar CAP funds is not compensated for by a 
larger  (smaller)  appropriation  in  terms  of  Structural  Funds,  as  indicated  by  the  non-significant 
coefficient. The relationship between the two policy areas is found to be non-systematic even when it 
is  attempted  to  relate  potential  compensation  synergies/mechanisms  to  structural  disadvantage  by 
introducing an interaction term between the two variables (column 3). 
The analysis of the structure of rural development policies – which as suggested by the foregoing 
analysis have undergone very significant development in recent years, in terms of their financing and 
territorial structure - reveals a good capacity to target financial resources upon the most disadvantaged 
areas (column 4). The somewhat "hybrid" nature of the Rural Development Policies, which is the 
result of a place-based transformation of the "old" sectoral policies, clearly emerges when we consider 
the  “knock-on  effect”  of  the  rural  development  funds  with  regard  to  both  first-pillar  CAP  funds 
(column  5)  and  regional  policy  funds  (column  7).  After  controlling  for  conditions  of  structural 
disadvantage, the areas that obtain more funds for rural development policies are those which have 
received a relatively higher amount of funds for the other two areas of Community policy, which 
denotes  a  dragging  effect  not  found  in  the  regional  policies.  Is  this  a  virtuous  process  for 
concentrating the resources of different policies in disadvantaged areas? The interaction term between 
                                                             
23 The choice of a Fixed  Effects approach is justified on both conceptual and empirical grounds. From the conceptual point 
of view, the regions included in the dataset cannot be considered as a ‘Random Sample’ of the EU regions. In addition the 
individual components cannot be considered as uncorrelated with the explanatory variables as assumed in a Random Effects 
approach. From the empirical standpoint, the Hausman test confirms that Fixed Effects estimation has to be preferred over 
Random Effects. The F-test for the joint significance of individual effects also confirms the high significance of the regional 
fixed effects. 
In our dataset the cross-sectional dimension is significantly larger than the time dimension (the explanatory variables cover 
the 1993-2006 period). In this context, the low time-series variability of the dataset a priori prevents non-stationarity from 
affecting our estimates through spurious correlation. The hypothesis of stationarity is confirmed by three different unit root 
tests for panel data (the Im-Pesaran-Shin, the augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron tests) which, as expected, 
reject the hypothesis of non-stationarity at conventional significance levels. 
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spending on "other" policies and the index of structural disadvantage indicates that synergies of this 
type are absent: as concerns both first pillar CAP spending (column 6) and regional policies (column 
8), the concentration of funds in the same areas does not coincide with the most disadvantaged areas. 
The rural development policies, therefore, seem to be significantly influenced by the other policy 
areas with respect to which they absorb resources and ‘borrow’ intervention models. However, this 
influence  does  not  translate  itself  into  synergetic  financial  allocations  in  favour  of  the  more 
disadvantaged areas. Conversely, the reduction in the relative weight (in terms of the Community 
budget) of first pillar CAP spending would seem to favour an increase in the overall relationship 
between  spending  and  structural  disadvantage  (thus  making  the  EU  budget  altogether  more  "pro 
cohesion”):  first  pillar  CAP  spending  is  quite  unrelated  to  the  disadvantage  of  beneficiary  areas 
(column 9). However, a regional allocation of funds that is the most compatible with the territorial 
cohesion objectives is not an "automatic" consequence of the shifting of resources from one policy 
area  to  another.  A  systematic  reading  of  the  results  suggests  that  the  reinforcement  of  rural 
development  policies  can  potentially  promote  compatibility  between  the  allocation  of  total  EU 
resources and cohesion. Yet the development of synergies in disadvantaged areas is still very limited 
as this is crucially conditioned by the need for a more pronounced "territorial vocation" of these 
policies, as also for a stronger integration and coordination with other policies “on the ground”. In the 
same way the capacity of regional policies to target resources upon the weaker areas has still to be 
improved and such a capacity is certainly very much influenced by changes in the mechanisms of 
policy regulation. 
4. Conclusions  
The structural and systematic analysis of the territorial structure of EU spending upon regional, rural 
development and agricultural policies over a period of almost 20 years (three programming periods 
from 1994 to 2013) has shown that the relations between the various policy areas and their degree of 
compatibility with the objective of EU territorial cohesion is constantly evolving and is still far from 
being "consolidated". 
The analysis of EU documents exhibits a growing emphasis upon coordination between policies and 
their compatibility with the cohesive territorial development of the European Union. However, the 
analysis  of  the  impact  that  successive  "adjustments"  to  the  Community  budget  and  the  macro 
processes of reform have had upon the spatial structure of expenditure, demonstrate that if, on the one 
hand, various policy areas show significant interrelations, on the other, the synergies between policies 
remain relatively limited and reveal a trend that is not always in line with the "declared" objectives of 
the  reforms  undertaken.  Furthermore,  it  emerges  that  there  is  no  clear  trend  towards  a  more 
favourable overall allocation to the cohesion process driven by greater spatial concentration and/or a 
more  accentuated  orientation  in  favour  of  the  more  structurally  disadvantaged  areas.  Successive 
reforms carried out in all policy areas (territorial allocation) and the reallocation of resources between 
policies within the Community budget (composition) have not produced an unambiguous impact on 
the level of compatibility with territorial cohesion processes. 
Nevertheless, the results produced do make it possible to clearly identify the weaknesses  of the 
various  policies  with  respect  to  territorial  cohesion  and  the  occasions  when  such  factors  have 
emerged, and offer  useful suggestions for the current debate on the composition of the Community 
budget  (in  terms  of  resources  to  be  attributed  to  the  various  policies)  and  the  reform  of  the 
intervention  mechanisms  of  the  single  policies  that  determine  the  territorial  allocation  of  their 
resources and the corresponding impacts on cohesion. 
As  regards  the  composition  of  Community  spending,  the  results  highlight  the  need  to  increase 
coordination  between  the  various  contexts  of  Community  policy  by  leveraging  the  synergies  and 
reciprocal functions that may be forthcoming from a coherent and integrated use of resources. Yet it is 
also clear that neither coordination with regional policies nor the shifting of resources from one policy 
area to another are "virtuous" in themselves as regards territorial cohesion. All areas of Community 
policy – including regional policies – have their light and dark sides in terms of how they target 
resources  on  structural  disadvantage:  the  capacity  to  make  a  positive  contribution  to  territorial 
cohesion depends crucially upon the policies actually implemented “on the ground” within the single 
policy areas and upon the respective allocation mechanisms.   21 
As regards the trend in the composition of Community spending, the case of first-pillar CAP is of 
enormous  importance.  This  policy  still  accounts  for  a  significant  component  of  the  Community 
budget (about 1/3), and its spending is not constrained by factors of structural disadvantage thereby 
allowing  it  to  retain  a  fundamentally  sectoral  approach,  despite  the  growing  emphasis  by  policy 
makers on the need that this policy adopt a regional vision. Its "counter treatment" nature with respect 
to cohesion policy interventions can only be justified for quintessentially sectoral objectives (e.g. the 
conservation of agricultural land, food quality, food security) of the policy, which would suggest the 
need for them to be carefully evaluated. In this sense, therefore, from the viewpoint of compatibility 
with territorial cohesion processes, the trend in the budget composition with its progressive movement 
towards  the  second-pillar  may,  potentially,  be  virtuous  in  terms  of  the  objective  of  promoting 
economic cohesion. This, though, is largely dependent upon the capacity of these policies to "remain 
focused" in thematic and spatial terms, especially by learning from the experience of regional policies 
but without replicating their defects. Thus, our results suggest that incorporating rural development 
policies in a more complex framework of cohesion policies – along the lines of the Barca Report 
proposal – would not by itself constitute a guarantee of greater orientation of these interventions 
towards  cohesion.  And  also  as  regards  regional  policies,  there  is  still  significant  room  for 
improvement  in  these  funds'  allocation  mechanisms  from  the  point  of  view  of  increasing  spatial 
concentration and focus on disadvantage. The progressive increase in the resources earmarked to this 
area of Community policy has not produced benefits in terms of spending structure but rather seems 
to have led to a partial "dilution" in the interventions over time. 
In the debate on the future of the EU regional policy two different views have emerged. On the one 
hand some economists and academics call for “some reallocation of the funds across target regions 
[that] would lead to higher aggregate growth in the EU and could generate faster convergence than 
current  scheme  does”  (Becker  et  al  2010  p.1).  On  the  other  hand  the  Barca  Report  suggests  a 
“conservative  view  on  territorial  allocation”  (pp.113  and  158)  on  the  basis  of  the  lack  of  valid 
alternatives to the existing distribution criteria, and the risk that “embarking on a complex revision of 
parameters would once again focus the policy debate on financial issues, distracting from the pressing 
issue of how the funds are used” (p.113). Our analysis suggests that these views should be reconciled: 
It showed that the geographic allocation of financial resources can be improved in all spheres of 
Community policy but it also suggests that this objective should be pursued by means of a careful 
evaluation of the specific needs of each region (also in terms of thematic priorities). For this purpose a 
set of robust indicators of economic and social disadvantage can certainly support a more transparent 
redistribution of financial resources. However, more effective targeting of financial resource towards 
structural disadvantage also requires the mobilization of national and local actors that the ‘strategic 
development contracts’ between each Member State/Region and the Commission  proposed by the 
Barca Report can certainly facilitate.  
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                          Table 1 – Databank structure by programming period, policy area and source of funding 
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Table 2 - Correlation Analysis: Per Capita Expenditure for Regional Policy, Rural Development and PAC 1st Pillar   

















Pillar 94-99  
PAC 1st 
Pillar 00-06  
PAC 1st 
Pillar 07-13  
Regional Policy 94-99 (Per 
Capita Expenditure)   
1                 
                      
Regional Policy 00-06 (Per 
Capita Expenditure)   
0.9680*  1               
     (0.000)                 
                      
Regional Policy 07-13 (Per 
Capita Expenditure)   
0.8961*  0.9250*  1             
     (0.000)  (0.000)               
                      
Rural Development 94-99 
(Per Capita Expenditure)   
0.8090*  0.7884*  0.7464*  1           
     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)             
                      
Rural Development 00-06 
(Per Capita Expenditure)   
0.5553*  0.5946*  0.5645*  0.6377*  1         
     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)           
                      
Rural Development 07-13 
(Per Capita Expenditure)   
0.4498*  0.4909*  0.4982*  0.5626*  0.7998*  1       
     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)         
                      
PAC 1st Pillar 94-99 (Total 
Regional Payment pc)   
0.4126*  0.4475*  0.4156*  0.4755*  0.3699*  0.3390*  1     
     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)       
                      
PAC 1st Pillar 00-06 (Total 
Regional Payment pc)   
0.3897*  0.4315*  0.4110*  0.4760*  0.4545*  0.4961*  0.9374*  1   
     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)     
                      
PAC 1st Pillar 07-13 (Total 
Regional Payment pc)   
0.3869*  0.4126*  0.3800*  0.4687*  0.4152*  0.4155*  0.8498*  0.9347*  1 
     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)     28 
                    Tab.3 - Measures of global spatial autocorrelation 
Variables  I  E(I)  sd(I)  z  p-value* 
Regional Policy 94-99   0.244  -0.007  0.042  5.973  0.000 
Regional Policy 00-06   0.25  -0.007  0.042  6.14  0.000 
Regional Policy 07-13   0.258  -0.007  0.042  6.305  0.000 
           
Rural Development 94-99   0.13  -0.007  0.042  3.254  0.001 
Rural Development 00-06   0.11  -0.007  0.04  2.932  0.002 
Rural Development 07-13   0.201  -0.007  0.042  5.01  0.000 
           
PAC 1st Pillar 94-99   0.116  -0.007  0.042  2.922  0.002 
PAC 1st Pillar 00-06  0.12  -0.007  0.042  3.03  0.001 
PAC 1st Pillar 07-13  0.105  -0.007  0.042  2.676  0.004 
           
Index of Structural Disadvantage (PCA)  0.339  -0.007  0.042  8.209  0.000 
*1-tail test             29 
Table 4 - Cross Section Analysis with country dummies 














PAC 1st Pillar 
1 
PAC 1st Pillar 
1 
PAC 1st Pillar 
1 
   1994-99  2000-06  2007-13  1994-99  2000-06  2007-13  1994-99  2000-06  2007-13 
Index of Structural Disadvantage 
(PCA)  54.05**  85.97***  80.38***  17.27***  35.89*  21.02*  189.3***  263.7***  224.0*** 
  (20.82)  (28.58)  (23.87)  (6.038)  (18.34)  (11.13)  (44.94)  (63.44)  (67.28) 
SE  28.97  21.67  85.08  7.375  114.0***  173.6***  -193.8  139.4  132.7 
  (33.09)  (88.38)  (68.78)  (10.66)  (22.32)  (11.21)  (148.8)  (145.7)  (150.4) 
DE  242.3***  273.1*  219.0**  59.75*  91.04*  89.73**  -228.5  -157.5  -61.47 
  (91.83)  (145.8)  (106.5)  (32.60)  (46.15)  (35.91)  (153.1)  (166.9)  (189.6) 
IT  131.6  71.79  51.63  34.07  25.39  89.90  -650.0***  -708.8**  -543.4* 
  (88.24)  (147.1)  (113.1)  (30.67)  (77.78)  (54.96)  (220.7)  (276.7)  (298.7) 
FR  40.13  -72.09  -107.4*  -0.0428  -3.962  31.67  304.2  450.9*  544.8** 
  (50.94)  (97.10)  (61.45)  (15.31)  (40.70)  (24.87)  (208.7)  (236.7)  (250.0) 
AT  -27.67  -78.80  -139.9*  -9.364  323.4***  420.3***  -466.7***  -116.7  -302.3 
  (70.94)  (123.9)  (83.59)  (17.34)  (45.77)  (26.96)  (168.0)  (190.3)  (205.8) 
BE  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
PT  1,095***  1,402***  1,310***  125.6***  206.5**  227.0***  -587.4**  -642.8*  -521.2 
  (99.77)  (184.6)  (195.3)  (29.75)  (85.07)  (49.44)  (259.3)  (335.9)  (343.2) 
NL  20.15  -93.19  -154.4***  -10.51  -48.99*  -30.30*  -129.2  -317.6*  -249.6 
  (50.57)  (96.87)  (53.73)  (12.98)  (29.25)  (18.24)  (154.1)  (162.7)  (172.3) 
UK  83.71  -14.93  24.00  -10.92  -39.82  24.46  -325.6**  -294.1*  -161.0 
  (59.20)  (90.97)  (84.98)  (12.94)  (27.58)  (21.95)  (152.7)  (159.4)  (174.7) 
ES  615.0***  677.9***  430.2***  84.62***  187.1**  156.3***  -32.19  367.6  617.5** 
  (86.93)  (134.7)  (102.1)  (19.48)  (71.97)  (45.40)  (211.0)  (278.0)  (305.9) 
GR  1,193***  1,754***  1,109***  150.1***  241.2***  237.4***  419.9  393.3  421.0 
  (112.3)  (177.7)  (115.0)  (28.72)  (80.30)  (49.07)  (270.0)  (331.8)  (402.7) 
FI  29.19  175.4  142.1  33.78*  197.1  511.2***  735.7***  1,914***  1,619*** 
  (54.28)  (138.1)  (100.2)  (20.01)  (191.5)  (169.5)  (168.6)  (339.8)  (331.9) 
Constant  129.9**  338.7***  326.9***  40.06***  111.9***  78.88***  925.5***  1,103***  946.5*** 
  (50.88)  (97.31)  (61.41)  (15.06)  (40.76)  (25.15)  (157.9)  (172.3)  (191.7) 
Observations  139  139  139  139  139  139  139  139  139 
R-squared  0.811  0.827  0.787  0.502  0.421  0.604  0.537  0.539  0.465 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                     30 
Tab. 5 - Panel Data Analysis (Fixed Effect Two-Way): Regional Policy, Rural Development Policy, PAC 1st Pillar 1994-2013   
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
























2013  1994-2013  1994-2013  1994-2014  1994-2013  1994-2014  1994-2013 
Index of Structural Disadvantage 
(PCA) Panel  44.27  47.71*  30.17  27.40*  32.06**  44.55***  24.81*  26.92*  -54.84 
  (27.45)  (26.06)  (30.00)  (14.33)  (13.79)  (14.25)  (13.51)  (14.26)  (50.63) 
PAC 1st Pillar    0.0627  0.0630    0.0849***  0.0847***  0.0753**  0.0749**   
    (0.0565)  (0.0578)    (0.0326)  (0.0318)  (0.0309)  (0.0304)   
Regional Policy               0.152***  0.157***   
              (0.0241)  (0.0290)   
Interaction Term 
Disadvantage*PAC 1st Pillar      0.0153      -0.0109       
      (0.0185)      (0.00865)       
Interaction Term 
Disadvantage*Regional Policy                -0.00472   
                (0.0101)   
TD00  96.02***  89.25***  89.14***  -19.89  -29.06**  -28.98**  -42.62***  -42.39***  108.0** 







155.6***  -159.7***  -145.7***  -148.4***  -121.5***  -121.1***  -164.2*** 
  (34.05)  (36.18)  (36.57)  (20.26)  (20.09)  (20.09)  (21.26)  (21.39)  (60.91) 
Constant  557.1***  493.7***  486.6***  222.3***  136.6***  141.7***  61.53  61.01  1,010*** 
  (20.38)  (64.10)  (66.82)  (10.04)  (34.12)  (32.82)  (40.02)  (40.33)  (38.53) 
                   
Observations  417  417  417  417  417  417  417  417  417 
R-squared  0.291  0.297  0.299  0.325  0.354  0.358  0.403  0.404  0.277 
Number of id  139  139  139  139  139  139  139  139  139 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses                   
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APPENDIX A – Index of Structural Disadvantage of the EU Regions: Principal Components 
Analysis (PCA) 
Table A.1 – Index of Structural Disadvantage: Principal Components Analysis,  Scoring coefficients  












Agricultural Labour Force  -0.4357  -0.1607  0.5541  0.6907  -0.0137 
Long Term Component of 
Unemployment  -0.1988  0.6518  0.5816  -0.439  0.0674 
Education Population  0.5864  -0.1657  0.3517  0.0632  0.7078 
Education Employed 
People  0.582  -0.0958  0.3971  0.0123  -0.703 
Kms of motorways per 
thousand inhabitants   0.2967  0.716  -0.2706  0.571  0.0052 
           
 
 
           
Table A.2 – Index of Structural Disadvantage: Principal Components Analysis,  Principal 
components/correlation  
Component  Eigenvalue  Difference  Proportion  Cumulative   
Component 1  2.424  1.29763  0.4848  0.4848   
Component 2  1.12637  0.102927  0.2253  0.7101   
Component 3  1.02344  0.611799  0.2047  0.9148   
Component 4  0.411645  0.397104  0.0823  0.9971   
Component 5  0.0145409  .  0.0029  1   
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APPENDIX B – Methodology for the computation of Common Agricultural Policy- First Pillar 
expenditure at the Regional Level  
The following Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) PUBLIC DATABASE indicators have been 
used for the computation of CAP-First Pillar Payments: Total Subsidies on Crops
24 (SE610), Total 
Subsidies on Livestock
25 (SE615) and Decoupled Payments
26 (SE630). Conversely, “Environmental 
Subsidies” (SE621) as per art.  69 Reg. (CE) n. 1782/2003 have not been included in the computation 
of total regional expenditure. 
The following steps have been followed for the computation of ‘Total Regional Expenditure for first-
pillar CAP: 
1)  The  above-mentioned  annual  subsidies  (Euro/Farm)  have  been  added  up  for  each  region  and 
multiplied  by  the  number  of  farms  located  in  each  region  (total  regional  subsidies)  and  each 
member state (total national subsidies); 
2)  Total national subsidies calculated on the basis of FADN data have been compared with actual 
payments as reported in the Yearly Financial Reports of EAGGF – Guarantee / EAGF (European 
Commission, 1994-2009); 
3) In order to account for non-commercial farms not covered by the FADN database, the difference 
between actual and estimated national payments has been subdivided across regions proportionally 
to their share of non-FADN farms (i.e. Number of Non-FADN Farms in Region i / Total Number 
of Non-FADN Farms in Country j) calculated from EUROSTAT data for each region; 
4) Total regional subsidies have calculated as the sum of ‘Total regional subsidies for FADN-Farms’ 
(Step 1) and ‘Total regional subsidies for Non-FADN-Farms’ (Step 3).  
5) Total payments in each Programming Period (to match Structural Funds and Rural Development 
expenditure) have computed reiteration of Steps from 1 to 4 for each individual year. 
As a robustness check, Total Regional Payments estimated with this procedure have been compared 
with a sample of actual payments at the regional level available from the Italian National Paying 
Agency. The Pearson Correlation between regional level payments is very high (0.98)
27. 
                                                             
24 Including:-Amounts paid to producers of cereals, oilseeds and protein crops (COP crops) and energy crops payments. -
Amount of premiums received by COP producers obliged to set aside part of their land. Such land may, however, be used for 
certain non-food crops -All other farm subsidies on field, horticultural and permanent crops. 
25 Including: Any subsidies on dairy products, All farm subsidies received for cattle other than dairy cows in production, Any 
subsidies on sheep/goat milk products, All other farm subsidies on other livestock or livestock products. 
26 Including: Single Farm payment, Single Area payment, Amount resulting from the application of modulation to the first 
EUR 5000 or less of direct payments 
27 Detailed table available upon request 
 
 